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Stock analysis is important for investors. 
However, little is known about how investors allocate 
their attention to different analyses. In the last two 
decades, online investment communities (OICs) have 
proliferated. In this study, we use investors’ online 
activities (i.e., comment and like) and amateur stock 
analysis in Seeking Alpha to explore how investors 
allocate their attention among different analyses by 
examining the effects of stock rating deviation on their 
attention. We measure the stock rating deviation of 
one analysis by comparing its stock rating with the 
previous rating for the same stock.  The results show 
that the analyses with stock ratings that are more 
deviated from the existing ratings tend to receive more 
comments and likes from investors, indicating that 
rating deviation from the consensus positively impacts 
investor attention to stock analysis. In addition, the 
deviation’s negativity and the stock volatility 
strengthen the impact of rating deviation on investor 
attention. However, analysts’ busyness status 
negatively moderates this impact.  
 
1. Introduction  
As sophisticated market participants, stock 
analysts play a crucial intermediary role in 
discovering, disseminating, and interpreting firm 
disclosures [1, 2]. A variety of studies have found that 
analysts provide valuable information and help 
investors make informed investment decisions [3-5]. 
Accordingly, analysts’ stock analysis, generally 
consisting of earnings forecasts, stock ratings, and 
detailed analysis, has been the most important 
reference for investors and received significant 
investor attention [2].  
Prior studies have provided a wealth of indirect 
inferences of investor attention to stock analysis via 
the number of analysts following a firm [6, 7] and the 
stock market reaction to analyst opinions [8, 9]. 
Although Lawrence, Ryans [10] examines page views 
of stock analysis in Yahoo! Finance and finds that 
investors pay more attention to stock analysis on days 
with earnings announcements and management 
guidance, providing direct evidence on investor 
attention to stock analysis, they regard all available 
analyses for a given stock as a whole and neglect to 
explore how investors allocate their attention among 
analyses, such as whether investors distribute their 
attention evenly across each analysis, and what 
analysis characteristics affect investors’ attention 
allocation. To fill this gap, we harness the unique 
chance provided by online investment communities 
(OICs) to observe investors’ attention allocation 
among analyses, particularly amateur stock analysis 
from non-official analysts who mainly depend on 
OICs to contribute and deliver their analyses. Existing 
studies suggest that similar to sell-side analysts, 
amateur analysts in OICs also offer valuable opinions 
to investors [11-13], and their stock analysis has 
become an essential component of analyst opinions 
that investors primarily rely on [14]. 
As attention is a scarce cognitive resource [15], 
investors have limited attention [16-18] and hence 
exhibit selective attention during information 
acquisition and processing [19]. The psychology 
literature shows that salient signals easily accessed and 
processed are more likely to be perceived and encoded 
[15, 20]. As stock ratings representing analysts’ 
investment advice are more salient than detailed 
analysis [21], investors may rely on rating-related 
indicators to decide which analysis to process. Given 
that analysts herd toward others by reducing the 
deviation between their rating and the consensus rating 
(i.e., rating deviation) [22], rating deviation can reflect 
how much private information analysts incorporate 
into their analysis[23]. In addition, it is possible that 
deviating ratings more informative than herding ones 
[24]. Due to the advantage of potential private 
information and the possible informativeness of 
deviating ratings, investors tend to regard rating 
deviation as an indicator of the level of analysts’ 
private information contained in analysis and pay 
more investor attention to deviating ratings. That is, 
the rating deviation may make investors think that 
analyses with deviating ratings have some unique 
opinions or private information and thus attach more 
importance to them. Therefore, in this study, we 





empirically examine whether the rating deviation 
impacts investor attention to stock analysis. Given that 
analysts (the providers of private information) usually 
have limited private information, and that investors 
(the demander of private information) desire more 
valuable information to make informed investment 
decisions in an uncertain environment [25], we 
explore whether analysts’ busyness status (i.e., 
analysts issue too many analyses) and the stock 
volatility play moderating role in the relationship 
between the rating deviation and investor attention. 
Also, given investors’ negativity bias [26], we 
investigate the moderating effect of the deviation’s 
negativity. 
We collect a data set from Seeking Alpha (SA; 
seekingalpha.com), where amateur analysts release 
stock analysis and issue ratings for analyzed stocks. 
Following prior research [24], for each analysis, we 
use the absolute difference between its stock rating 
and the consensus rating to measure rating deviation. 
We use the total number of comments and likes 
received by each analysis as a proxy for how much 
attention investors paid. Our results show that the 
analyses whose stock rating deviates more from the 
consensus rating receive more investor attention. 
Furthermore, we find that the impact of rating 
deviation on investor attention is more pronounced 
when the analysis’s rating deviates downward from 
the consensus rating and when the stock volatility is 
high. However, analysts’ busyness status weakens this 
impact. The moderating effects indicate that investors 
adjust the intensity of depending on rating deviation to 
allocate attention to analyses based on the supply and 
demand of private information, suggesting that 
investors regard rating deviation as the signal of the 
level of private information contained in stock analysis 
to allocate their attention to analyses to obtain 
analysts’ private information they needed. To validate 
our findings, we also conduct four robustness checks 
and obtain similar results. 
Our study contributes to the academic literature in 
the following aspects. First, we provide new insights 
into the literature on investor attention to stock 
analysis. Prior research has explored investor attention 
to stock analysis by treating all analyses for each stock 
as a whole [10]. We move further from this research 
by examining investor attention specific to individual 
stock analysis and considering the role of analysis 
characteristics. Second, we extend the literature on the 
impacts of analysts’ herding behavior. Prior research 
has focused on its influence on analysts’ performance 
[24, 27, 28] and the stock market [22, 29, 30], but we 
turn our sight to its effects on investor attention. Third, 
we enrich the research on analysts’ decision fatigue. 
Prior studies have provided evidence of analysts’ 
decision fatigue, and find that decision fatigue leads to 
less accurate and timely earnings forecasts and stock 
ratings [31, 32]. We test how investors respond to 
analysts’ decision fatigue, and the results show that 
investors rely less on rating deviations to allocate their 
attention to amateur analysis when the analysis is 
issued by a busy analyst. The findings provide 
evidence on the effects of analysts’ decision fatigue on 
investors’ information choices. 
2. Hypotheses 
2.1. The impact of rating deviation on 
investor attention 
Kahneman [15] states that attention is a scarce 
cognitive resource, and individuals have limited 
attention. Due to attention constraints, individuals 
cannot notice everything, particularly in an 
information-rich economy [33]. Miller [34] shows that 
individuals usually only remember about seven items 
when processing information, which leads to deficits 
in information processing capabilities. Extensive 
research has consistently reported that investors suffer 
from limitations of attention and information 
processing capabilities [35-37]. For example, 
investors are unable to fully process Friday earnings 
announcements [16] and merger announcements [18], 
as their limited attention is occupied by other 
activities.  
Given the limitation of information processing 
power caused by attention constraints, faced with a 
wealth of available information, investors tend to be 
selective in information acquisition and processing 
[19, 38]. The psychology literature suggests that 
individuals must first perceive and encode information 
as a mental representation in the brain before 
processing and understanding it [39]. As perception 
and encoding information requires attention and effort, 
individuals are more likely to focus directly on signals 
that are easily accessible and processed, i.e., salient 
signals [20]. In the context of stock analysis, stock 
ratings are more salient relative to detailed stock 
analysis, as they provide direct investment advice, 
suggesting investors buy, hold, or sell a given stock 
[21]. Bearing the above in mind, investors may depend 
on stock ratings to decide whether to pay attention to 
stock analysis. 
According to the herding theory [22], analysts 
tend to mimic others and issue herding ratings when 
having little private information, and instead, they will 
hold on to their views and release ratings that deviate 
more from the consensus rating if their private 
information is superior and overwhelming. As a result, 
analyses with deviating ratings contain more private 
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information than those with herding ratings. In 
addition, deviating ratings have been found to be more 
informative than herding ones [24]. In the context of 
OICs, where all analyses for each stock are integrated 
into one specific page, investors can compare each 
analysis’s stock rating with others directly and 
estimate its deviation from the consensus rating easily. 
As a result, considering the advantage of private 
information and the informativeness of deviating 
ratings, investors may regard rating deviation as the 
signal of the level of private information contained in 
stock analysis and pay more attention to analyses with 
larger rating deviations to pursue private information. 
Therefore, we formulate our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The stock analysis whose 
stock rating deviates more from the consensus rating 
receives more investor attention. 
2.2. The moderating role of rating deviation’s 
negativity 
Research in behavioral finance has found that 
investors exhibit negativity bias. Investors have 
different responses to good news and bad news [26, 
40]. In particular, they react more strongly to bad news 
than good news [26]. Moreover, individuals have 
stronger evaluative reactions to negative information 
than positive information, even when they are equally 
probable and equally extreme [41]. 
When the stock analysis has a negative rating 
deviation (i.e., its rating deviates downward from the 
consensus rating), it implies that the analyst has a more 
negative expectation of the stock returns than others. 
Due to the negativity bias, investors may strengthen 
their reactions to the analyses with negative rating 
deviations. Given the role of rating deviation in 
investors’ attention allocation, the negativity of rating 
deviation may motivate investors to rely more on 
deviation to allocate attention to stock analysis. In 
contrast, if stock analysis’s rating deviates upward 
from the consensus rating, the more positive 
expectation of the stock returns will weaken investors’ 
response to this analysis. In addition, as fake news 
exists in the OICs [14], investors are likely to suspect 
analysts who issue positive deviating ratings to obtain 
compensation from public companies. As a result, the 
impact of rating deviation on investor attention 
becomes weaker when the rating deviates upward 
from the consensus. This leads to our second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The deviation’s negativity 
positively moderates the relationship between rating 
deviation of stock analysis and investor attention.  
2.3. The moderating role of analyst’s 
busyness status 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky [42] show that decision 
quality declines after devoting effort to make complex 
decisions in a given time due to the draining of mental 
resources, a phenomenon known as decision fatigue. 
Decision fatigue is a universal phenomenon, and 
several studies document decision fatigue in various 
settings. Hirshleifer, Levi [31] show that sell-side 
analysts issuing too many earnings forecasts in a given 
time become decision fatigue, and their forecast 
accuracy declines, since analyzing stock value is a 
slow and rigorous reasoning process that requires 
mental resources. Similarly, for busy amateur analysts 
who contribute too much analysis within a given time, 
their resulting draining of mental resources will lead 
to decision fatigue and temporarily reduce the quality 
of the subsequent stock analysis. As a result, investors 
are more cautious about the opinions of busy analysts 
than those of not-busy analysts.  
In addition, private information is based on the 
acquisition and the analytical ability of stock-relevant 
information. An individual’s private information is 
limited. If analysts are in the status of busyness, it is 
inevitable to distribute very little private information 
into each analysis. In particular, their analyses with 
larger rating deviations are unlikely to be high quality 
and driven by the sufficient possession of private 
information. Therefore, rating deviation cannot reflect 
the level of private information contained in stock 
analysis that is from busy analysts, and thus investors 
may rely less on rating deviations to allocate attention. 
On the contrary, if analysts are not busy, they are 
free from decision fatigue and with fewer information 
constraints. In such a context, amateur analysts have 
enough time and mental resources to reasoning the 
stock value and rationally choose to herd towards the 
consensus or not based on an objective estimation of 
the possession of private information. As a result, the 
rating deviation is a trustworthy and reliable signal 
reflecting information content. Accordingly, investors 
put more weight on the rating deviation to evaluate the 
informativeness of analysis when allocating their 
attention. Thus, we propose our third hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Amateur analyst’s busyness 
status negatively moderates the relationship between 
rating deviation of stock analysis and investor 
attention. 
2.4. The moderating role of stock’s volatility 
Historical volatility is a statistical measure of the 
dispersion of returns for a given stock over a given 
period of time. Volatility is usually related to 
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uncertainty or risk. Due to the uncertainty and risk, 
investors demand more information to make informed 
investment decisions. Given the finding that deviating 
stock analysis generally contains more analysts’ 
private information[23], investors are more likely to 
pay attention to deviating rating when stock volatility 
is high. As a result, stock volatility may positively 
moderate the relationship between the deviation and 
investor attention. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Stock volatility positively 
moderates the relationship between rating deviation of 
stock analysis and investor attention. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data source 
The primary data for this study comes from 
Seeking Alpha (SA), a leading OIC in the stock 
analysis market, with 40 million monthly user visits. 
In this study, we focus only on the constituent stocks 
of the Standard & Poor’s 500 index (S&P 500). We 
select these stocks because they cover a broad range of 
industries and represent over half of the market 
capitalization of the entire U.S. stock market. In 
addition, most of them attract many amateur analysts 
and investors to analyze and discuss them in SA.  
We collect all the analyses for each stock issued 
between March 6, 2019 and Jan 05, 2021. Some of 
them discuss multiple stocks simultaneously, causing 
some difficulties in distributing investor attention to 
each stock-analysis combination. To measure investor 
attention accurately, we focus only on 15,070 single-
stock analyses in this study. The information on each 
analysis includes analysis ID, analysis content, 
publication date, analyst ID, stock ticker, stock rating, 
comments, and likes. Similar to sell-side ratings, the 
five possible stock ratings are “Very Bullish”, 
“Bullish”, “Neutral”, “Bearish”, and “Very Bearish”, 
we convert them into numerical scores (5, 4, 3, 1, and 
1) to quantify ratings issued by amateur analysts. We 
also collect each analyst’s personal information and 
release history.  
For the stocks in our sample, we collect financial 
market data from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) and sell-side analyst data from the 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S), 
respectively. In order to interpret easily, we reverse 
IBES rating codes so that “1” corresponds to “Strong 
Sell” and “5” corresponds to “Strong Buy”. We 
exclude stock-analysis observations that lack stock-
specific characteristics. To ensure a sufficient number 
of amateur analysts and investors to analyze and 
discuss them, we only retain the stocks that have more 
than 20 analyses in our study period. These criteria 
leave us with a final sample of 9,068 stock-analysis 
observations. 
3.2. Variable descriptions 
In this study, we use the total number of 
comments and likes received by each stock analysis to 
measure investor attention (Attention). In addition to 
writing comments to discuss with analysts, interested 
investors may click the “Likes” button to give 
feedback, especially when they support the views 
contained in an analysis. In other words, both 
commenting and liking reflect that investors have paid 
attention to this analysis. According to the finance 
literature, stock-related information is time-sensitive, 
and the analysis of fundamentals generally predicts 
future three-month stock returns [11]. As a result, 
investors usually pay no attention to opinions posted 
more than three months ago when seeking advice for 
their investment decisions. Therefore, we classify 
comments made after 90 days as ex-post attention. 
Since we are interested in investor attention in the 
information acquisition process, we exclude all ex-
post investor attention. Unfortunately, we cannot rule 
out ex-post likes since there is no available data on the 
timing of clicking the “Likes” button. Therefore, we 
use the number of comments received by stock 
analysis as another proxy for investor attention in 
robustness checks. 
Following Palmon, Sarath [24], for each analysis, 
we use the absolute difference between its stock rating 
and the consensus rating to represent its rating 
deviation (AbsDeviation). Since analysts have limited 
attention [32], they only refer to a certain amount of 
analyses when herding toward others. In addition, they 
also consider the activeness of the analysis. Therefore, 
we follow two rules in the calculation of the consensus 
rating. First, we select a reasonable visual range and 
average only the included stock analyses. SA presents 
10 of the most recent ratings on the first screen. As a 
result, investors pay attention to at least 10 ratings. In 
addition, individuals usually notice limited items when 
processing information[34]. We thus set this range as 
15 analyses and verify the results with 10 and 20 in the 
robustness checks. Second, we choose 90 days as an 
effective time interval to screen out stale opinions and 
retain active ones. In particular, if no less than 15 
analyses are issued within 90 days before the analysis 
release, the consensus is the average of the latest 15 
ratings. Otherwise, we average all ratings within the 
last 90 days.  
To test H2, H3, and H4, we introduce three 
moderators. The first one is Negativity, indicating 
deviation’s negativity. It equals one if the analysis’s 
stock rating deviates downward from the consensus 
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rating; otherwise, it equals zero. The second moderator 
is Busyness, reflecting an analyst’s busyness status. In 
particular, it equals one if the analyst issues no less 
than 10 analyses within 30 days before releasing the 
analysis, and zero otherwise. We use 10 analyses to 
judge whether an analyst is in the busy status is 
because the mean and median of the number of articles 
analysts issued within 30 days are 8 and 11.5. 
Although Busyness can also serve as a proxy for the 
quality of writer, it is less likely the case in the OIC 
because the purpose of analysts is to provide accurate 
analysis and more busy analysts are more likely have 
expressed their private information before which leads 
to a less valuable analysis. The third moderator is the 
past stock return volatility, and we use the standard 
deviation of daily returns over the past month to 
measure Volatility. 
We control for a host of amateur analyst-, 
analysis-, and stock-specific characteristics related to 
investor attention. In particular, we control for Words, 
Figures, Analytic, and Clout to consider the effects of 
the general quality of analysis or the amount of effort 
exerted by the analysts on investor attention. Table 1 
defines all variables used in this paper. Here, t denotes 
the day when the analysis is released. In the calculation 
of abnormal returns, if the analysis was issued on a 
weekend or holiday, day t corresponds to the following 
trading day. 
 
Table 1 Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent Variable 
Attention The number of comments and likes received by the stock analysis. SA 
Independent variable 
AbsDeviation The absolute difference between the analysis’s stock rating and the consensus rating. SA 
Moderator Variables 
Negativity A dummy variable indicating whether the analysis’s stock rating deviates downward from the consensus rating. SA 
Busyness A dummy variable indicating whether the analysts is busy. In particular, it equals one if the analyst issues no less than 10 analyses within 30 days before releasing the analysis, and zero otherwise. SA 
Volatility The standard deviation of daily returns over days [t-30, t-1]. CRSP 
Control Variables 
MonthsOnSA The number of months between her/his first analysis and the stock analysis for the analyst. SA 
Marketplace A dummy variable indicating whether the analyst provides “Marketplace” service. SA 
Words  The number of words in the analysis. SA 
Figures  The number of tables and figures in the analysis. SA 
Analytic The degree to which the analyst uses words that suggest formal, logical, and hierarchical thinking patterns in the analysis, coded by LIWC. SA 
Clout The relative social status, confidence, or leadership that the analyst displays through their writing in the analysis, coded by LIWC. SA 
Analyses The number of analyses for the stock on day t. SA 
EADate0 A dummy variable indicating whether the analysis is published on the earnings announcement date. I/B/E/S 
EADate1 A dummy variable indicating whether the analysis is published on the first day after earnings announcement date. I/B/E/S 
EADate2 A dummy variable indicating whether the analysis is published on the second day after earnings announcement date. I/B/E/S 
EADate3 A dummy variable indicating whether the analysis is published on the third day after earnings announcement date. I/B/E/S 
MGDate0 A dummy variable indicating whether the analysis is published on the management guidance date. I/B/E/S 
MGDate1 A dummy variable indicating whether the analysis is published on the first day after management guidance date. I/B/E/S 
MGDate2 A dummy variable indicating whether the analysis is published on the second day after management guidance date. I/B/E/S 
MGDate3 A dummy variable indicating whether the analysis is published on the third day after management guidance date. I/B/E/S 
IBESDispersion The standard deviation of sell-side ratings within 90 days prior to the analysis release.  I/B/E/S 
IBESRating The average of sell-side ratings within 90 days prior to the analysis release.  I/B/E/S 
ARett-1 Value-weighted market-adjusted return on day t-1. CRSP 
ARett-2 Value-weighted market-adjusted on day t-2. CRSP 
ARet[t-60,t-3] Value-weighted market-adjusted buy-and-hold return over days [t-60, t-3]. CRSP 
Weekend A dummy variable indicating whether the analysis is released on a weekend.  
3.3. Research model 
To explore whether stock analysis’s rating 
deviation affects investor attention, we estimate the 
regression of investor attention on rating deviation and 













Stock denotes the stock fixed effects, and Week 
denotes the week fixed effects. To address skewness 
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in some variable distributions, we take natural 
logarithms of Variable plus 1, denoting 
Log(Variable). Variable includes Attention, 
MonthsOnSA, Words, Figures, and Analyses. The 
regression is estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS) with robust standard errors. According to H1, 
the coefficient on AbsDeviation ( 1α ) is expected to be 
significantly positive. 
4. Empirical analyses and results  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Before moving on to our empirical results, we 
first present some descriptive information about all the 
variables in Table 2. We can observe that the minimum 
of Attention is 0, while its maximum is 2,407, 
suggesting that stock analysis generates different 
investor attention. Statistics for Negativity show that 
41.7% of the analyses deviate downward from the 
consensus. On average, amateurs appear to exert great 
efforts to contribute analyses since these analyses 
include a fair amount of tables and figures (the mean 
of Figures is 5.561). In addition, both the correlation 
matrix and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests 
indicate that multicollinearity is not dominant across 
our explanatory variables [43, 44]. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
Attention 68.475 92.359 0.000 40.000 2407.000 
AbsDeviation 0.715 0.577 0.000 0.600 4.000 
Negativity 0.417 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Busyness 0.395 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Volatility 0.027 0.020 0.005 0.021 0.158 
MonthsOnSA 64.807 39.856 0.000 63.667 174.967 
Marketplace 0.433 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Words 1533.661 773.168 47.000 1350.000 11711.000 
Figures 5.561 5.070 0.000 5.000 91.000 
Analytic 92.769 5.717 36.010 94.380 99.000 
Clout 52.917 9.106 22.930 52.070 88.230 
Analyses 1.346 0.705 1.000 1.000 7.000 
EADate0 0.028 0.166 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EADate1 0.043 0.204 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EADate2 0.028 0.164 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EADate3 0.023 0.149 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MGDate0 0.010 0.101 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MGDate1 0.015 0.121 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MGDate2 0.010 0.099 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MGDate3 0.009 0.093 0.000 0.000 1.000 
IBESDispersion 0.709 0.404 0.000 0.707 2.121 
IBESRating 3.452 0.577 1.500 3.500 5.000 
ARett-1 -0.000 0.031 -0.459 -0.000 0.420 
ARett-2 -0.001 0.029 -0.426 -0.000 0.270 
ARet[t-60,t-3] -0.011 0.172 -0.646 -0.010 2.420 
Weekend 0.088 0.283 0.000 0.000 1.000 
4.2. Main analyses 
Table 3 presents the estimated results of the 
effects of rating deviation on investor attention. As 
presented in Column (2), the estimated coefficient on 
AbsDeviation is significantly positive (0.167) at the 1% 
level. The results provide strong support for H1; that 
is, the stock analysis whose stock rating deviates more 
from the consensus rating receives more investor 
attention. The coefficient estimates on the control 
variables in Columns (1) and (2) are generally 
consistent with our expectations. The negative 
coefficient estimates on Log(Analyses) imply that 
investors allocate less attention to each one if there are 
too many analyses on the same day, providing 
evidence of investors’ limited attention. Interestingly, 
we find that IBESDispersion has a positive impact on 
investor attention to amateur analysis. The results 
suggest that when investors cannot obtain consistent 
investment advice from sell-side analysts, they resort 
to amateur analysts. Hence, this provides evidence that 
amateurs supplement sell-side information for 
investors and confirms that investors harness amateur 
analysis because of their information demand [12]. 
The coefficient estimates on Weekend are positive and 
significant, inconsistent with the notion that investors 
have more severe attention constraints on weekends. 
The inconsistency is due to the lack of analyses these 
days.  
We further explore the moderating roles. To 
avoid multicollinearity, we center all the independent 
variables and the moderators before interacting them 
[45]. As indicated the Column (3) of Table 3, there are 
positive and significant coefficients on AbsDeviation 
× Negativity and AbsDeviation × Volatility. The results 
suggest that the deviation’s negativity and the 
volatility of stock returns strengthen the impacts of 
rating deviation on investor attention, supporting H2 
and H4. In addition, there is a negative and significant 
coefficient on AbsDeviation × Busyness. The result 
suggests that the analyst’s busyness status weakens the 
impacts of rating deviation on investor attention, 
supporting H3. 
4.3. Robustness Checks 
We conduct several robustness checks to 
validate our results. First, we concern potential issues 
from using 15 analyses to measure consensus rating 
and thus we consider two alternative measures of 
AbsDeviation by adjusting the range of vision. The 
first measure (AbsDeviation10) narrows it to the latest 
10 ratings. The second measure magnifies it to the 
latest 20 ratings (AbsDeviation20). We then redo our 
analysis with them to further check our findings. As 
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Panel A and B in Tables 4 indicated, our measures of 
rating deviation do not induce the sensitivity of our 
results. 
Table 3. Main Analyses 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AbsDeviation  0.167*** 0.140*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) 
AbsDeviation × Negativity   0.087*** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation × Busyness   -0.055** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation × Volatility   1.897*** 
  (0.61) 
Negativity -0.046*** -0.082*** -0.084*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Busyness -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.054*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Volatility 3.687*** 4.026*** 4.024*** 
 (0.54) (0.53) (0.53) 
MonthsOnSA 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Marketplace 0.095*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Words 0.213*** 0.224*** 0.225*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Figures 0.113*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Analytic -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Clout -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Analyses -0.377*** -0.383*** -0.385*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
EADate0 0.094* 0.106** 0.104** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
EADate1 0.087** 0.094** 0.100** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
EADate2 0.113** 0.105** 0.101** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
EADate3 -0.053 -0.032 -0.027 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
MGDate0 -0.088 -0.096 -0.099 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
MGDate1 -0.033 -0.021 -0.027 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
MGDate2 -0.131 -0.114 -0.107 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
MGDate3 0.107 0.093 0.088 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
IBESDispersion 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
IBESRating -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.073*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ARett-1 -1.121*** -1.068*** -1.059*** 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
ARett-2 -0.528** -0.467* -0.439* 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) 
ARet[t-60,t-3] -0.584*** -0.569*** -0.578*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Weekend 0.229*** 0.227*** 0.228*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 3.845*** 3.656*** 3.586*** 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
Stock & Week FE YES YES YES 
Observations 9, 068 9, 068 9, 068 
Adjusted R2 0.635 0.642 0.643 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
Table 4 Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Robustness Check with AbsDeviation10 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AbsDeviation10  0.168*** 0.139*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) 
AbsDeviation10 × Negativity   0.094*** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation10 × Busyness   -0.056** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation10 × Volatility   1.851*** 
  (0.60) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 9, 068 9, 068 9, 068 
Adjusted R2 0.635 0.642 0.643 
Panel B: Robustness Check with AbsDeviation20 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AbsDeviation20  0.167*** 0.141*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) 
AbsDeviation20 × Negativity   0.086*** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation20 × Busyness   -0.054** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation20 × Volatility   1.824*** 
  (0.61) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 9, 068 9, 068 9, 068 
Adjusted R2 0.635 0.642 0.643 
Panel C: Robustness Check with the Number of Comments 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AbsDeviation  0.210*** 0.153*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) 
AbsDeviation × Negativity   0.156*** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation × Busyness   -0.066** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation × Volatility   1.803*** 
  (0.68) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 9, 068 9, 068 9, 068 
Adjusted R2 0.610 0.618 0.620 
Panel D: Restriction of More than Two Stock Ratings 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AbsDeviation  0.173*** 0.155*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) 
AbsDeviation × Negativity   0.069** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation × Busyness   -0.061** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation × Volatility   1.731*** 
  (0.64) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 8, 272 8, 272 8, 272 
Adjusted R2 0.620 0.628 0.628 
Panel E: Robustness Check with Month Fixed Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AbsDeviation  0.165*** 0.141*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) 
AbsDeviation × Negativity   0.083*** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation × Busyness   -0.056** 
  (0.03) 
AbsDeviation × Volatility   1.883*** 
  (0.60) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 9, 068 9, 068 9, 068 
Adjusted R2 0.635 0.642 0.643 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Second, we only use the number of comments as 
a proxy of investor attention instead of the total 
number of comments and likes. The results reported in 
Panel C are similar to prior ones. Besides, to alleviate 
the concerns that controversial articles may arouse 
intense discussion, which leads to that the total number 
of comments may overestimate attention, we use the 
number of unique investors writing comments for 
articles as a proxy of investor attention, and our results 
are robust.  
Third, to calculate the consensus rating more 
reasonably, we delete the observations when there are 
less than three stock ratings. As reported by Panel D, 
the results are largely consistent with the main results. 
Fourth, we use month fixed effects instead of 
week fixed effects in the models. The results reported 
in Panel E are similar to prior ones, further indicating 
the robustness of our main results. Also, to control 
unobserved analyst-related variables that might 
influence investor attention, we consider author fixed 
effect in our model. Also, to further validate our result, 
we adopt a more rigorous stock-yearmonth fixed effect. 
The results consistently indicate the positive effects of 
rating deviation on investor attention.   
5. Discussion 
In this paper, we explore how rating deviation 
impacts investor attention to stock analysis. Through a 
series of empirical analyses, we obtain several 
important findings. First, rating deviation has a 
positive impact on investor attention. It means that 
investors distribute their attention unevenly across 
each analysis, and to pursue more analysts’ private 
information, they pay more attention to analyses 
whose stock ratings deviate more from the consensus 
rating. The results confirm that due to limited 
attention, investors exhibit attentional preferences 
when allocating attention to information [19]. Kadous, 
Mercer [46] show that under experimental conditions, 
the deviating information increases investors’ 
willingness to choose and acquire. We extend this 
finding by providing empirical evidence that the effect 
exists in investors’ actual information acquisition.  
Second, the impact of rating deviation on investor 
attention is more pronounced when the rating deviates 
downward from the consensus rating. This suggests 
that the deviations’ negativity enhances investors’ 
attentional preference for analyses with deviating 
ratings. Our findings confirm investors’ negativity 
bias [26, 40, 41]. Moreover, we find that the rating 
deviation has a more pronounced impact on investor 
attention when stock volatility is high. The results 
suggest that when the stock price is uncertain, 
investors intensify their preferences to deviating 
ratings due to the larger demand for private 
information. Furthermore, we find that investors 
discount the attention allocation to the stock analysis 
with deviating ratings that are issued by a busy analyst, 
indicating that investors are able to recognize analysts’ 
decision fatigue and concerns the level of private 
information contained in these analyses. The analyses 
on the moderators examine the mechanisms: the 
readers perceive whether the analyst has unique 
opinions and private information through the rating 
deviation.  
5.1. Theoretical Contributions 
Our study makes theoretical contributions in the 
following three aspects. First, we provide new insights 
into investor attention to stock-related information. 
Previous studies have mainly focused on how 
investors allocate attention to certain types of 
information, such as portfolio information [47], SEC 
filings [48], accounting information [25], and stock 
analysis [10]. Our study continues to investigate 
investor attention to stock analysis. However, unlike 
prior research, we leverage the OICs and examine 
investor attention specific to individual stock analysis 
instead of regarding all analyses for each stock as a 
whole [10]. In addition, to measure investor attention, 
some prior research assumes that investors should pay 
attention to the information exposed to them [49-51]. 
However, this assumption is overstrict [52]. In this 
study, we use the number of comments received by 
each analysis to measure investor attention. This 
measure identifies the information that investors 
actively seek and acquire. Therefore, it not only 
captures investor attention at the individual analysis 
level, but also guarantees the authenticity of attention.  
Second, we extend the literature on the impacts of 
analysts’ herding behavior. Previous studies have 
found its influence on analysts’ performance [24, 27, 
28] and the stock market [22, 29, 30]. However, as 
information intermediaries, analysts play a role in 
producing and delivering investment advice for 
investors in the stock market [11-13]. Therefore, their 
herding behavior inevitably affects investor reaction. 
We expand prior research by considering another 
impact, investors’ attention allocation to stock 
analysis. We present empirical evidence on the effects 
of amateurs’ herding behavior on investor attention.  
Finally, this study adds to recent research on 
analysts’ decision fatigue. Prior studies have provided 
the evidence of analysts’ decision fatigue, and find that 
decision fatigue leads to less accurate and timely 
earnings forecast and stock ratings [31, 32]. We test 
how investors respond to analysts’ decision fatigue. 
Our results show that investors rely less on rating 
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deviations to allocate their attention to amateur 
analysis when the analysis is from a busy analyst. The 
findings provide evidence on the effects of analysts’ 
decision fatigue on investors’ information choice. 
5.2. Practical Implications 
The results of this research provide important 
implications for both amateur analysts and community 
owners. Given the development of amateur analysis, it 
is crucial to understanding how investors allocate their 
attention across analyses. Specifically, we have found 
that analyses with deviating ratings attract more 
investor attention. This result suggests that investors 
regard rating deviations as a signal reflecting the level 
of analysts’ unique opinion or private information and 
thus attach more importance to deviating opinions. 
Community owners should build some mechanisms to 
motivate amateur analysts to share deviating opinions. 
For example, they can introduce monetary or non-
monetary incentive programs to reward analysts who 
voice differently. In addition, communities should 
display the consensus rating after each stock rating. 
This change will grant investors greater access to 
rating deviations. As a result, communities will 
indirectly punish analysts’ herding behavior and 
promote deviating opinions. 
5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has two limitations. First, our sample 
only covers the S&P 500 component stocks, and our 
study period only encompasses less than two years. 
Future research should increase the number of stocks 
and extend the study period to generalize our results. 
Additionally, future work could explore the 
determinants of amateurs’ herding behavior. We also 
call for studies to investigate how the deviating 
analyses affect the stock market. 
6. Conclusion  
In this study, we use a novel data set in OIC to 
study how investors allocate attention among analyses. 
The results show that the analyses whose rating 
deviates more from the consensus rating receive more 
investor attention, indicating that the rating deviation 
has a positive impact on investor attention. In addition, 
the deviation’s negativity and the stock volatility 
positively moderate the relationship between rating 
deviation and investor attention, and however, 
analysts’ busyness status negatively moderates this 
relationship. Our findings enrich the understandings of 
investors’ attention allocation to stock analysis and 
have implications for amateur analysts and community 
owners sharing more deviating opinions, thereby 
meeting investors’ information demand.  
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